

As to Plaintiff Sharon Imel, residency is meaningless for purposes of diversity jurisdiction; an individual's citizenship is determined by his or her domicile. *Dakuras v. Edwards*, 312 F.3d 256, 258 (7th Cir. 2002); see *Heinen v. Northrop Grumman Corp.*, 671 F.3d 669, 670 (7th Cir. 2012) (“[R]esidence may or may not demonstrate citizenship, which depends

on domicile—that is to say, the state in which a person intends to live over the long run.”); *Guar. Nat’l Title Co. v. J.E.G. Assocs.*, 101 F.3d 57, 58-59 (7th Cir. 1996) (explaining that statements concerning a party’s “residency” are not proper allegations of citizenship as required by 28 U.S.C. § 1332). Therefore, Defendant must advise the Court of the domicile of Plaintiff Sharon Imel, which demonstrates citizenship.

With respect to Plaintiff Estate of David L. Imel, under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(2), “the legal representative of the estate of a decedent shall be deemed to be a citizen only of the same State as the decedent.” *Gustafson v. zumBrunner*, 546 F.3d 398, 400-01 (7th Cir. 2008) (noting that the federal diversity statute treats the legal representative of a decedent’s estate as a citizen of the same state as the decedent); *accord Hunter v. Amin*, 583 F.3d 486, 491-92 (7th Cir. 2009). Therefore, Defendant must recite the domicile of the decedent at the time of his death, and in turn, the citizenship of the Estate.

Therefore, Defendant is ORDERED to file on or before April 2, 2015, an amended notice of removal that properly alleges the citizenship of Plaintiffs.

SO ORDERED.

Enter for this 19th day of March 2015.

s/ Susan Collins
Susan Collins,
United States Magistrate Judge